

Industry View, Observations, Thoughts & Recommendations Regarding Naval Mine Warfare (Countermeasures)

May 2005

Panama City, Florida

“Nattering Nabob of Negativism” →

“Positive Pundit of Progress”

Summary – Naval Mine Warfare

- Substantially more Rhetoric than action – new team is taking action
- Significantly more talk than money – holding on to money & executing
- General lack of visible commitment and priority – new team is making it happen
- Constantly changing requirements/approaches – rarely complete/field anything new – Team is now committed to fielding capability
- “Play with R&D – but will not fund production” – FYDP has significant funding for production systems – Out Years
- Since Desert Storm – it’s now been 14 years – what do we have to show for it?? – Systems are now entering LRIP and will be fielded by FY 07
- Not at all clear that more of the same will yield any different result. – Commitment to MCM on LCS is positive move

Program Churn - Ten Years of Constant Change

- Assault Breaching System in, out, in – now doing Precision Carpet bombing – but it works
- Re-engining in, then out (\$135M swizzle – programs killed to pay for something that was then not needed)
 - Retiring MHC's
- AQS-20 in, out, in over a six week period – **MS C = LRIP**
 - First to be on MH-53E, then MH-60S with common approach for RMS added in for good measure
- RMS - **MS C 6/6/06**
 - DD963, then not
 - DDG 51, then not, then limited number
 - HSV-2
 - LCS
- AMCM on MH-53E, then MH-60S, then what? Now both
- Dedicated, Organic, Combination – Settling in on Mix
- **Updated UUV MP, but LMRS – no production; ?? MR UUV ??
LD UUV**

FY06 Navy Budget Request

- **Total RDT&E Request = \$18.04B (R-1)**
 - MIW RDT&E Request = \$273.58M **(1.52%)**
- **Total Procurement Request = \$29.7B (P-1)**
 - MIW Procurement Request = \$139.7M **(0.47%)**
- **Total RDT&E plus Procurement = \$47.7B**
 - MIW Investment = **0.87%**
- **Total Navy Budget Request = \$125.6B**
 - \$38B – Personnel
 - \$36B – O&M
 - \$52B – Investment

0.87% of Total Investment for

“Showstopper” & “Achilles Heel” – *Can't be Right???*

And it's down, not up from last year!!!

Funding Priorities – **Not MIW** –

Extracts from FY 05 UFR submitted March 2004
(61 items for \$2.691B)

- **Top 10 Priority** = **\$344.4M (12.7%)**
 - Open Architecture \$21.8M
 - NSW Service Common Support \$67.2M
 - F/A-18 APN-5 \$11M
 - CH53 Engine Reliability Improvement \$40M
 - Aircraft Survivability Equipment \$34M
 - Sea Warrior \$43M
 - ESSM Missile Quantity \$22M
 - P-3 Simulators \$44.7M
 - Tactical/Vessel Control Trainer Upgrades \$40.7M
 - Task Force ASW \$20M

Other Observations

- Since 1995 little new hardware/capability delivered to fleet– but total expenditure of all accounts equals about **\$7B** (annual TOA ~ \$700M)
- Contract awards and subsequent performance inevitably run into problems that should have been known
 - Stop playing liars poker and buying the **apparent** lowest cost bid
- ONR/ACTD's seem to continually compete with Programs of Record (POR's) vice developing complementary technologies for future insertion
 - Just what **technology** is SPARTAN proving – it's all been done before
- Earlier – Navy/OSD supported MIW with words **and** \$
- Funding shortfalls continue across the board, yet continue to award new programs – why not finish the ones underway first??
 - Currently appears to be “**drunken sailor approach**” – keep ordering more – can't afford what already doing!

Other Observations (cont'd)

- **Rhetorical support – wonder about veracity – Lack of “consistency”**
 - **Funding shortfalls with little effort to remedy – no MIW programs on UFR list for FY-05; ONE for FY-06**
 - **Retired MCS without replacement and no real plan to solve – pick-up game with LHA,**
 - **Retiring some or potentially all of the MHC’s,**
 - **Abandoning aspects of both organic SMCM and AMCM,**
 - **Mesmerized by a leased ferry boat while avoiding/ducking substantive issues – integration, C4I, adequate training, “mainstreaming”**
 - **Admission that MH-60S can’t do adequate job but continue to press on,**
 - **Limited investment in the required C4I,**
 - **Currently all “hopes” are on a Vu-graph ship – how many LCS’s with MCM modules will be in the fleet by 2015?? Or even 2020??**
 - **How many unmanned vehicles is ONR and the Navy going to fund – each with their own approach to planning, control, C4I – spares, training etc?**
 - **This endless stable of hobby horses is extremely costly and getting no where!!**
 - **The current vision is similar to the Campaign Plan touted in 1995 – only it has a longer timeframe. Will the results be any different??**

Other Observations (cont'd)

- **Lack of Systems Engineering & wishing for solutions to be successful**
 - Willey nilley approach to finding a solution to mines (and ASW).
 - The 11 meter rib or the SDV. - It's the sensors & processing – **NOT the vehicle!!!**
 - There seems to be no rigorous system analysis - just sort of a wishing process. No thought about sea state and its impact – for example.
 - **“Let's throw it in the water and see what it does”** is contrary to the engineering process and meeting stated requirements/capabilities.
- **How does industry respond to these issues?**
 - How does industry know what the Navy is thinking they have for problems? **Don't talk, don't involve, hold the “enemy” at arms length!**
 - Why is it not more of a partnership in the area of Gap analysis and results to industry to solve in a collaborative fashion.?
 - Why do we have to pry out the info to help?
- **Sea Trials process.**
 - Why is it so hard to participate and find out what is going on?
 - Industry wants to help so why are we keeping the process and issues such a secret?
 - How does this transition to the acquisition system? Where are the “requirements” or “required capabilities”? **Where's the funding?**

Opinions

- **Some in industry are growing exceedingly frustrated of buoying up what should be a critical focus area for the US Navy**
 - **“If you don’t care why should we?”**
 - **If they don’t spend their money – why should anyone else??**
- **Most in industry have spent **far** more than they have made – investment vs. EBIT**
- **Many have expended political capital on the hill with little support from the Navy – “We support the President’s Budget!”**
- **Many are irritated at the virtual thanklessness that exists**
 - **Confrontation with Program Offices**
 - **Competition with Labs**
 - **Constant re-direction, re-education, re-justification and then re-competition**
- **Competition for Competition sake with little or no true competition nor rationale**
- **Frustration at continued Liar’s Poker and then reprogramming and plus-up’s to fix under-funded programs**
- **Lack of government accountability – they move on, retire**

Opinions/Questions (cont'd)

- **Why so little on UFRL?**
 - Doesn't demonstrate priority, commitment, or consistency.
- **Balance between waiting for LCS MIW MM vice tech updates to MCM ... i.e. SQQ 32 upgrades, SLQ 48 replacements – we're letting the 32 die??**
- **How is the current Organic capability going to be fielded/deployed:**
 - Prior to LCS entering fleet ...
 - While LCS enters the fleet in smaller numbers ...
 - Once LCS is fielded in larger quantities.

Opinions/Questions (cont'd)

- **Impact of the Congressional NMIW Caucus?**
- **N752 developed the MCM vision. It has been blessed by CNO & OSD.**
 - **What do we need to do to get a champion to turn it into accepted doctrine?**
 - **Shouldn't there be a next level of detailed development (e.g. the UUV Master Plan) to shape S&T, R&D & acquisition around a common set of objectives and timelines?**
- **From an operational standpoint the goal of Mainstreaming MIW seems to have migrated from a CSG/ESG centric concept {that implied inclusiveness and understanding both at the platform (CV - AMCM, DDG - WLD-1, SSN - LMRS) and the Command/Staff level (Sea Combat Commander, MIWC, BG/ARG CDR)} to "let's just throw everything at LCS and that community will figure it out".**
 - **Has Navy just pigeon-holed OMCM into a faster dedicated force (LCS with MIW MPs) and foregone real mainstreaming?**

Some Recommendations

- Focus on completion & delivery of systems to operators in a reasonable time – **That now seems to be the approach**
- Accept 85% solution, field it & then work on improving – vice working for an infinite period to deliver the ultimate solution
- Improve program stability by making it more difficult to start programs, stop programs and change programs – it's all too easy to constantly be “jiggering” the programs year to year – wasting time & money - delivering nothing
- There was a great deal of “hype” about mainstreaming – little impact to date and the training has been reduced not increased. It is time to reassess and “mainstream” for real!
- Unite efforts between ASW and MIW and create USW focus – similar environment, similar sensors, similar operators etc. increase constituency
- Support organizations and interest groups should consolidate to bring greater energy & focus.

Some Recommendations (cont'd)

- **Benefits of harnessing commercial computers and software**
 - Cheaper (price driven down by huge demand of personal computers & IT), lighter weight, more compact etc.
 - Open the pathway to commonality all of which combine to make systems more affordable.
 - Should be exploitable by the MIW community if demand that the LCS mission modules be truly modular with high degree of commonality.
 - Perhaps we can actually get some mine warfare capability out in the fleet by leveraging these concepts.
- **Industry used to get copies of output from USN MIW FLOC/EXCOM**
 - Haven't seen anything in about a year.
 - If USN wants industry support, helpful if feedback provided from primary USN MIW event where policies are addressed & some decisions made.
 - Industry also used to be invited selectively to participate – not any more – why?
 - ***Mushrooms don't make the best "partners".***

Things Just Take Longer

- **Creation of the World – 6 days** – Long time ago
 - No Legacy systems, no bureaucracy, unlimited budget
- **Manhattan Project – 38 months** – June, 1942 – August 6, 1945
- **POLARIS SLBM program:**
 - Missile – **43 Months** - December 17, 1956 – July 20, 1960 (1st Operational Patrol November 1960)
 - Submarine – **24 months** – December 31, 1957 – December 1959
- **Lunar Landing Program – 98 months** - May 25 1961 (Kennedy speech to Congress) – July 20 1969 (Landing)
 - 11/7/1958 – Mercury ; 01/03/1962 – Gemini
- **Organic Mine Warfare – 118 Months & Counting** - July, 1995 – May, 2005