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| | THE
FINAL DOOR
AN ARMY-NAVY-MARINE CORPS PROBLEM
"The coast of Kuwait resembled Normandy's Omaha Beach on the eve of
D-Day in World War II. On likely
landing beaches Iraqi combat engineers had emplaced antiboat and antipersonnel
mines, thickets of stakes called "hedgehogs," underwater electric
cables, barbed wire entanglements, and other obstacles meant to sink or ensnare
landing craft and kill marines trying to reach the shore.
To cover the beach, the enemy had erected Silkworm batteries, dug
trenches, and built bunkers. The
latter were spaced 25 to 50 yards apart and surrounded by chain link fences to
deflect rounds from direct-fire weapons. From
Ash Shuaybab northward, the Iraqis fortified high-rise condominiums and other
buildings which overlooked the beach. Earthen
berms, land mines, antitank ditches, dug-in tanks and barbed wire obstacles
blocked the likely exits from the beach. Elements
of four enemy infantry divisions guarded the coast between Kuwait City and the
Saudi border. At al-Ahmadi the
tanks and infantry of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division stood by in reserve to
blunt any breakout from the beach area. In
short, Saddam's generals clearly expected the U.S. Marines to storm ashore in
Kuwait."
British members of the MCM coalition forces estimated that to clear sea
echelon and fire support areas to protect the MCM forces as they cleared assault
lanes to the beach would require 16 to 20 days, and 43 days if the Iraqi Sigeel
acoustic influence mine was encountered. The
planned assault at Ash Shuaybab was cancelled.
Instead a feint against Faylaka Island was used to divert attention from
Schwarzkopf's end run in the north. A
right jab to cover a left hook.
"Iraq successfully delayed and might have prevented an amphibious
assault on Kuwait's assailable flank, protected a large part of its forces from
the effects of naval gunfire, and severely hampered surface operations in the
northern Arabian Gulf, all through the use of naval mines."
Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet/Commander
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command.
Marolda, Edward J., and Schneller, Robert J. Jr.
"Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf
War," Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.,
1998, pages 247-268.
Kicking down the final door through which ground troops and logistics
supplies must flow is a problem shared, directly or indirectly, by all the
Services.
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